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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ZONING LAW IN TEXAS
RicHAim D. WALKER*
P ERHAPS the greatest legal influence of this century on the
development of commercial and residential realty has been
the extension of police power to the regulation of building upon
and use of urban real estate under what are generally termed
zoning laws; and it seems unquestionable that this influence will
continue to grow both rapidly and intensively. In 1927 the Texas
Legislature enacted this State's first important zoning law.' Since
that time practically every major city in Texas has enacted zoning
ordinances.2 A substantial amount of case law has followed.
Out of the rapid expansion of commerce and industry have
come many developments affecting public health, morals, safety
and that ill-defined catch.all, the general welfare. Governmental
controls, including among others the regulation of building con-
struction and land and building use was to be expected. Equally
expectable was the fact that control, in the form of zoning laws,
would result in isolated cases of hardship or even injustice, and in
an almost universal desire on the part of individual property
owners to escape the rigors of the laws' operation upon them
personally.
The purpose *of this paper will be first to outline the substantive
law of zoning in Texas, next to set out some of its procedural
aspects, and finally to offer conclusions on the subject in general.3
*Partner, firm of Phillips, Walker & Ludlum; member, Fort Worth Bar.
1 Tx. 1Ev. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 101la-1011k.
2 A notable exception is Texas' largest city, Houston.
3 As general references and for coverage of certain particular aspects and situations
see 10 TEx. Jum., Ti YEAR Suer., ZONiNC, 183 (1948); YOxK.LY, ZONiNG LAW AND
PRACTICE (1948).
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I
URBAN ZONING"-THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Zoning has been defined as "a general plan to control and direct
the use and development of property in a municipality, or a large
part of it, by dividing it into districts according to present and
potential use of the property."
4
Most zoning litigation arises out of restrictions on the building
or use of apartments, suburban stores and other types of com-
mercial activities in residential districts; however, the same legal
principles apply to all types of district classification as well as to
all other aspects of zoning law.
Prior to 1926, there existed among the states in this country a
definite split of authority on the validity of zoning ordinances as
a legitimate exercise of the police power. Up to that time in Texas
no statute of any broad scope had been enacted concerning zoning.'
In 1921 a Dallas ordinance restricting commercial uses in resi-
dential areas was tested in the case of Spann v. City of Dallas!
Chief Justice Phillips, delivering the opinion of the Court, de-
4 Devaney v. New Haven Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 349, 45 A. (2d) 828
(1946).
5 State ex rel Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923) ; Lincoln Trust
Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 128.N. E. 209 (1920), sustaining the valid-
ity of such ordinances. Contra, Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 Ad. 50 (1925) ;
Ignociunas v. Risley, 98 N. J. L. 712, 121 Ad. 783 (1923) ; Spana v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 350,
235 S. W. 513 (1921).
' A city has no zoning power other than that conferred by statute. City of West Uni-
versity Place v. Martin, 113 S. W. (2d) 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
In 1921 Art. 1175 (26), now considered impliedly repealed by Luse v. City of Dallas,
131 S. W. (2d) 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) writ of error refused, was passed giving a
simple grant of zoning powers to cities on a home rule charter basis. Before 1921 the
only basis for statutory authority to zone was by general provisions relating to general
welfare.
7 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513 (1921). One of the provisions of the ordinance in ques-
tion provided that permits for commercial use might be issued if three-fourths of the
property owners in the district consented. The court found this feature especially objec-
tionable, saying that a man may not be deprived of the lawful use of his property because
his tastes are not in accord with those of his neighbors. All city ordinances now avoid
any such neighborhood consent features. See City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S. W. 944
(Tex. Civ. App. 1922) writ of error refused; City of Dallas v. Burns, 250 S. W. 717 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1923) writ of error refused; City of Dalli- v. Urbish, 252 S. W. 258 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923).
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clared in effect that use zoning was an improper exercise of the
police power, that the ordinance was clearly not a regulation for
the protection of the public health or safety or welfare, but that
its object was to satisfy a sentiment against the mere presence of a
store in a residential part of the city. Stressing the right to own
property and deal with it as the owner chooses, so long as the use!
harms nobody, as a part of the citizen's natural liberty, the Court
declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Other Texas decisions following the Spann case held in sub-,
stance that general zoning regulations are not within the police
power. Thus the Texas courts' effectively put an end to zoning in
Texas until Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company' was
decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1926, and the
present zoning enabling statutes were passed in 1927.
It was in the Euclid case that the United States Supreme Court-
for the first time passed upon the validity of city zoning. In this-
case, the Ambler Realty Company owned a tract of 68 acres in
Euclid, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland. In 1922 the village council
for the purpose of establishing a comprehensive zoning plan
adopted an ordinance which restricted the use of this tract to
residential purposes. The realty company complained of the or.
dinance on the grounds that it was in derogation of the 14th
Amendment in that it deprived it of property without due process
of law, (the value of the land for commercial uses being $10,000
per acre but only $2500 per acre for residential uses), and that it
denied it the equal protection"0 of the laws. The court held that
the ordinance infringed no constitutional right. Mr. Justice Suther-
land, speaking for the Court, said:
8 Other Texas decisions following the Spann case include: Dallas v. Mitchell, 245
S. W. 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) writ of error refused; Marshal v. Dallas, 253 S. W. 887
(Tex. Civ. App. 1923) writ of error dismissed; Dallas v. McElroy, 254 S. W. 599 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1923) writ of error dismissed.
9272 U. S. 365 (1926).
10 It will he observed that the "equal protection" guaranty of the 14th Amendment
is at least theoretically violated in the application of all zoning ordinances. The question,
has never been fully met by any Texas court; however, see Conner v. City of University-
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"The ordinance now under review and all similar laws and regula-
tions must find their justification in some aspect of the police power
asserted for the public welfare. The line which in this field separates the
legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of
precise delimitation; it varies with the circumstances and conditions.
... Thus, the question whether the power to forbid the erection of a
building of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question
whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined not by
an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered
apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances in the
locality.
".... If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning pur-
poses be fairly debatable, legislative judgment must be allowed to con-
troL""
The 1927 Statutes
The Euclid case having established as a general proposition that
proper city zoning is a valid exercise of police power, the Texas
Legislature in 1927 passed enabling statutes specifically empower-
ing the legislative bodies of cities and incorporated villages "for
the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general
welfare of the community ... to regulate and restrict the height,
number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the
percentage of a lot that may be occupied, the size of the yards,
courts and other open spaces, the density of population and the
location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, in-
dustry, residence and other purposes."' 2 Not only were these
statutes specific but also very broad, as can be seen by the inclu-
sion of the term "general welfare." While requiring that "all such
regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of building
throughout each district,"'" they also provided that "the regula-
tions in one district may differ from those in other districts.""
Park, 142 S. W. (2d) 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ of error refused, and authorities
cited therein.
11272 U. S. 365, 387 (1926).
"2 Trx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1011a.




The enactment sets out purposes, in addition to the promotion
of health, morals, etc., which the city legislative bodies shall bear
in mind in passing such regulations. This same article prohibits
the interference with a nonconforming use existing at the time of
the adoption of the zoning ordinance."m
The Validity of the 1927 Statute, in General
Following the passage of these statutes, a large number of
municipalities enacted comprehensive zoning ordinances, and
under one of the earliest of these the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals
in Scott v. Champion Building Company'6 upheld Dallas' refusal
to issue a permit to erect a filling station on a corner lot in an area
zoned as residential. However, the 1927 statute did not receive its
first real test until the case of Lombardo v. City of Dallas" was
decided by the Texas Supreme Court in 1934. That case also in-
volved the right of the city to deny a permit to erect a filling station
in a residential district. The Court, specifically approving the de-
cision in the Scott case, sustained the city and upheld the zoning
statutes of 1927 as "an admissible exercise of that power of the
government of Texas known as the police power."'
Chief Justice Cureton, speaking for the court, stated:
"All property is held subject to the valid exercise of the police powers.
Nor are regulations unconstitutional merely because they operate as a
restraint upon private rights of personal property or will result in loss
to rights of personal property or will result in loss to individuals ...
Moreover, police regulations do not constitute a taking of property
under the right of eminent domain; and compensation is not required
to be made for such loss as is occasioned by the proper exercise of the
police power."' 9
The court reiterated the general constitutional law rule that
regulations adopted under the police power must be based on
15 Id., Art. 1011c.
26 28 S. W. (2d) 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
17 124 Tex. 1, 73 S. W. (2d) 475 (1934).
1s Id. at 3, 73 S. W. (2d) 475, 478.
19 Id. at 4, 73 S. W. (2d) 475, 478.
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public necessity, and stated that if such a regulation as that under
consideration be enacted avowedly for the protection of the public
health and have a real, substantial relation to that object, the
courts will not strike it down solely upon grounds of public policy
or expediency, as it is not the province of the courts to question
the wisdom of municipal ordinances; the courts' authority extends
only to holding a statute invalid if it is clearly unconstitutional,
and to holding an ordinance void if it is clearly and plainly un-
reasonable or arbitrary.
A regulation based purely on aesthetic considerations, the court
pointed out, would be unreasonable.' ° The court also stated that
it would "follow the method of a gradual approach to the general
by a systematically guarded application and extension of constitu-
tional principles to particular cases as they arise."'"
The total effect of the case was to hold that the police power in
Texas may properly be extended to the regulation and restriction
of the use of urban realty and to regulation of spacing, height and
construction of buildings thereon.
Texas Cases, General
Inasmuch as the Lombardo case settled the question of the valid-
ity of the Texas zoning statutes and city zoning ordinances in
general, most of the litigation since that time has involved amend-
ments and exceptions to local zoning ordinances, particularly
exceptions requested and refused. The Texas decisions do not fall
easily into well-defined categories; however, a review of selected
zoning cases involving different types of situations will serve to
illustrate, in a practical light, the attitude of Texas appellate
courts toward the zoning probelms that most frequently arise.
The court in the Lombardo case took judicial notice that filling
stations increase traffic hazards and that "gasoline and other in-
flammable petroleum products are explosive and constantly men-
20 Id. at 4, 73 S. W. (2d) 475, 479. But there has been an observable tendency, in
more recent cases, to give aesthetic considerations more and more weighL
21 Id. at 11, 73 S. W. (2d) 475, 486 (quoting the Euclid case) .
1949]
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ace the safety of persons and property wherever stored or kept for
sale,"'" and therefore ruled that the ordinance in question had a
reasonable relationship to the public interest sought to be protected.
In Young v. City of Abilene"-2 a permit was requested to set up a
cleaning and pressing plant in a residential district. Evidence had
been adduced upon a hearing before the Board of Commissioners
that such plants put off obnoxious odors and create fire hazards
because of the kind of chemicals used. The court observed that the
fact that permits may have been previously issued, as exceptions,
for the establishment of the same type of business within the pro-
hibited area was not alone sufficient to show that the City Commis-
sion had abused its discretion in refusing the permit requested in
this case."'
The court in City of Dallas v. Lively 5 upheld the city in denying
a filling station permit on the triangular end of a residential block,
though a number of businesses existed nearby (including a non-
conforming filling station use located diagonally across the street)
and though a jury had found as a matter of fact that the property
was not suitable for residential purposes. Justice Looney rendered
a vigorous dissenting opinion largely based on the almost confisca-
tory loss in value-$12,500 to $500-which the refusal of a per-
mit for commercial use entailed.
Thus it is apparent, in cases in which the exception desired
involves a filling station or any other use employing inflammable
substances, that a very difficult if not impossible task confronts the
disappointed applicant in the courts.
City of West University Place v. Ellis"0 was a case which, like
the Lively case, involved a substantial loss in value caused by
refusal to grant an exception, but which, unlike the Lively case,
did not involve a filling station use. Nearby non-conforming uses
22 Id. at 8, 73 S. W. (2d) 475, 482.
23 195 S. W. (2d) 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) writ of error refused, no reversible error.
24 Id. at 840.
25 161 S. W. (2d) 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) writ of error refused.
26 134 S. W. (2d) 1038 (Tex. Comm. App. 1940) opinion adopted.
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existed. The court, in finding that the ordinance, as applied in this
case, was arbitrary and unreasonable, quoted a United States
Supreme Court case" to the effect that where the loss in value is
almost total there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the restriction. Thus, though loss in value
is not controlling, it is at least a factor for consideration.
On the other hand, loss in value to surrounding property has
also been taken into consideration by the courts in upholding
restrictions. In University Park v. Hoblitzele" a permit was
sought for the erection of commercial buildings on two lots in the
City of University Park. There were business houses across the
street and to the immediate north, and also to the immediate south
but across the city boundary in Highland Park. Holding that
private interest must yield to the good of the community, the court
found that to allow the permit would substantially decrease the
market value of the surrounding residential property, as well as
create additional traffic hazards; etc.
Luse v. City of Dallas" involved two lots in a block which was
zoned residential but which lay across the street from two busi-
nesses in a block classified commercial. The court upheld the city
in denying a permit for commercial use of the two lots saying that
such use would result in substantial damage to the value of adjoin-
ing and nearby residential property in addition to causing traffic
congestion, noise and making the residential area undesirable.
In Texas Consolidated Theaters, Inc. v. Pitillo,° the applicant
desired an exception to a residential classification for the purpose
of establishing a parking lot in the rear of its theater. The Board
of Adjustment allowed the exception despite the protest of adjoin-
ing property owners. While reversing the Board's ruling on other
grounds, the court found that the Board was justified in its con-
27 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922).
28 150 S. W. (2d) 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) certiorari denied by U. S. Supreme
Court, 315 U. S. 781 (1942).
21 131 S. W. (2d) 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) writ of error refused.
30 204 S. W. (2d) 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
1949]
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clusion that a denial of the exception would result in substantial
detriment to the applicant and that the establishment of the park-
ing lot would not be against the public interest but would, on the
contrary, be subservient thereto.
In Conner v. University Park1 a dentist was denied a permit to
make structural changes in his residence for office use although in
the same residential district, about two miles away an architect
maintained his office in his home. In upholding the city the court
found that to allow the requested use would increase the traffic
hazard and the opportunity for spread of contagious disease, ad-
versely affect environment, privacy of home life, render the section
less desirable for homes and reduce property values.
Another recent Texas case 2 involved a request by a physician
for a permit to enlarge his house to include a laboratory and re-
ception room. The ordinance under which the district was zoned
permitted one family dwellings together with uses customarily inci-
dent thereto when not involving the conduct of a "business." Al-
though the practice of medicine is not generally considered a
"business" and though it is customary in many areas for doctors
to practice in their homes, the court held that it was not an abuse
of discretion on the part of the Board of Adjustment to deny the
permit.
In Edge v. City of Bellaire"' a property owner had used his
house in a district classified residential as a cafe for many years
without interference from the city. The city had even issued a
permit for the improvement of the house for cafe purposes, though
it was later revoked. Nevertheless the court held that no vested
right in the cafe use had been created in the property owner and
that the city and its citizens cannot be estopped or bound by the
unauthorized acts of its officers.
s, 142 S. W. (2d) 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ of error refused.
32 City of Harlingen v. Feener, 153 S. W. (2d) 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) writ of
error refused, want of merit.
3s 200 S. W. (2d) 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) writ of error refused.
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Similarly it has been held that a zoning ordinance may be
invoked against one seeking a building permit even though he
applied for the permit and filed suit upon its refusal, before the
ordinance was passed."' Likewise, a landowner who owned prop-
erty outside a city and had started construction work on it before
the city annexed the property and who continued the work after
annexation and before a zoning ordinance was passed, was held to
have acquired no vested rights in the use."5
In Corpus Christi v. Jones"0 property was bought for the purpose
of establishing an ice manufacturing plant in an area classified
commercial. Although there were similar valid non-conforming
uses in the same commercial district, the city ordinance specifically
provided that such plants could be set up only in manufacturing
districts. A permit was secured from a city engineer and an ice
plant, including machinery, was actually set up for operation.
Nevertheless, the court held the ordinance valid and that it could
be enforced by way of an injunction restraining further operation
of the plant.
On the other hand in Amarillo v. Stapf'7 which was a case
involving property located in a "first" manufacturing district,
which had been acquired for the purpose of erecting a foundry,
whereas the Board of Adjustment determined that foundries could
operate only in "second" manufacturing districts, it was held that
since other uses not unlike a foundry use were permitted in the
"first" district the restriction was unreasonable and arbitrary."
A zoning classification restricting the sale of intoxicating liquor
in an area near a public school bears a reasonable relationship to
public morals and general welfare."9
34 McEachern v. Highland Park, 124 Tex. 36; 73 S. W. (2d) 487 (1934).
35 City of Dallas v. Messerole Bros., 155 S. W. (2d) 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
writ of error denied ,want of merit.
36 144 S. W. (2d) 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ of error denied, judgment correct.
37 129 Tex. 81; 101 S. W. (2d) 229 (Tex. Comm. App. 1937) opinion adopted.
BE 109 S. W. (2d) 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) writ of error dismissed.
39 Eckert v. Jacobs, 145 S. W. (2d) 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
-1949]
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It should be noted also that the power of the city to zone cannot
override restrictive covenants in existence at the time the zoning
ordinance is passed."0
Non-conforming Uses and Extensions Thereof
In compliance with Article 1011c' the usual zoning ordinance
provides that the lawful use of a building existing at the time the
ordinance was passed may be continued although such use does not
conform with the ordinance.
With respect to structural changes or enlargement of a non-
conforming building use the typical ordinance provides that such
building may not be "enlarged, extended, reconstructed or altered
unless its use is changed to a use permitted in the district in which
such building is located.. .'"2
A recent case on this point is San Angelo v. Boehme Bakery."
The bakery was in existence as a non-conforming use in a residen-
tial area. The owner desired to extend the building to the rear and
side for accessory non-conforming use purposes. The property
desired to be taken in by the extension was vacant land owned by
the applicant at the time the zoning ordinances were passed. The
Supreme Court upheld the Board of Adjustment in its refusal to
permit the extension.
The existence within a district of non-conforming uses similar
or identical to a use applied for is no basis for a contention of
unreasonable discrimination."
Concerning change of use of a building which is non-conforming
it is sometimes provided that the use of such building "may be
changed to another use of the same or more restricted classification
but where such use is changed to a more restricted classification it
40 Spencer v. Maverick, 146 S. W. (2d) 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) ; note, 9 TEx. L.
Rav. 440 (1931) ; note 16 Tax. L. REv. 265 (1938).
41 Ta.X REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art 1011c.
42 City of Corpus Christi Ordinance No. 2266, Art. XXI, § 5 (1948).
43 144 Tex. 281, 190 S. W. (2d) 67 (1945).
44 Eckert v. Jacobs, 142 S. W. (2d) 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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shall not thereafter be changed back to a use of a less restricted
classification.""
Another typical ordinance provision with respect to the vacancy
or temporary discontinuance of a non-conforming use states that
if the building is left vacant or its non-conforming use is discarded
for one year "it shall not thereafter be occupied except by use
which conforms to regulation of the district in which it is lo-
cated." 6 Similarly, some ordinances provide that if a non-con-
forming building is moved in whole or in part to another location,
even on the same lot, it must conform to the regulations of the
district in which it is located. 7
The right to repair or replace a non-conforming building after
partial destruction or obsolescence presents an interesting problem
of zoning law. One Texas city ordinance provides:
"A non-conforming use shall not be extended or rebuilt in case of
obsolescence or total destruction by fire or other cause. In case of par-
tial destruction ... not exceeding 50% of its value, the building inspec-
tor shall issue a permit for reconstruction. If greater than 50% and less
than total, the Board of Adjustment may grant permit for repair after
public hearing .... ,,48
In contrast, another city's ordinance provides:
"Nothing in this ordinance shall be taken to prevent the restoration
of a building destroyed to the extent of not more than 75% of its rea-
sonable value... nor the continued ... use of such building ... which
existed at the time of such partial destruction .''4
Though akin to the question of replacing after total obsoles-
cence, there seems to be no objection to keeping a non-conforming
use building in good repair so as to prevent such obsolescence.
Commercial signs and billboards existing at the time of passage
of a zoning ordinance although non-conforming are often required,
45 City of Corpus Christi Ordinance No. 2266, Art. XXI, § 2 (1948).
46Id., § 3.
47 Id., § 6.
4 City of Dallas Ordinance No. 4047, Art. 165-19, § 3 (1947).
'4 City of Fort Worth Ordinance No. 2082 as amended, § 9 (c) (1940).
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by the ordinance, to be removed within a specified time after its
passage.5
With respect to the non-conforming use of land, as distinguished
from non-conforming use of buildings, some ordinances provide
that such use may continue for a limited period only, and that it
may not be extended to adjoining property and that when discon-
tinued it shall not be resumed."'
To prevent future non-conforming uses, a number of zoning
ordinances now require that when new land is annexed to the city,
if any person is in process of erecting a building upon such land
and the building is incomplete, no further work shall be done
except upon issuance of a permit authorizing the work to be
continued."
In general the city ordinances dealing with non-conforming uses
reflect a desire by city planners to eliminate such uses as rapidly
as possible, consistent with the statute and constitutional guaran-
tees, in order to achieve the greatest possible degree of city wide
uniformity.
Miscellaneous
A special problem arises when restrictions are placed upon such
uses as public buildings, privately owned public service businesses,
schools, churches and similar uses.
There is only one statutory exception to the Texas Zoning Act,
namely, buildings for telephone service. 3 However, the Supreme
Court in City of Sherman V. Simms " held that the police power
could not be extended to restrict the location of churches regard-
less of the district classification.
Two recent civil appeals cases55 have upheld the city in allowing
50 The Fort Worth Ordinance requires removal within three years. Ibid, § 9 (d).
51 See Fort Worth and Corpus Christi zoning ordinances.
52 City of Dallas Ordinance No. 4047, Art. 165-4, § 4 (1947).
53 TFx. Rav. CrV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1011i.
54 143 Tex. 115, 183 S. W. (2d) 415 (Tex. Comm. App. 1944) opinion adopted.
55 Taylor v. McLennan County Crippled Home, 206 S. W. (2d) 332 (Tex. Civ. App.
[Vol. 3
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exceptions to permit the establishment of children's homes in
residential districts. Neither of these cases, however, ruled upon
the question of whether it would have been an invalid exercise of
police power if the cities had refused the permits.
The highest city zoning classification is usually designated a
"single family residence" district, and in addition to residence
uses the following additional uses are often allowed in such dis-
tricts: church (except rescue missions or temporary revivals);
school, public or private; public parks, playgrounds, golf courses
(except miniature golf courses and driving ranges); public recrea-
tion and community buildings and public museums; municipal
buildings; non-profit libraries or museums; police and fire sta-
tions; public utility installations."
Some ordinances, however, provide for the issuance of special
council permits for drive-in theaters, hospitals, miniature golf
courses and driving ranges, nurseries or greenhouses, private clubs,
philanthropic or correctional institutions, privately owned and
operated parks and playgrounds, radio transmission towers, and
temporary commercial amusement enterprises such as circuses."
Special permit exceptions are also often provided for to allow
group housing units, shopping villages, etc.
By allowing them in the highest classification district (i.e., single
family residence) many cities exclude from restriction such uses
as farming, truck gardening, orchard, nursery or greenhouse uses,
provided no wholesale or retail office is maintained on the
premises."8
Where an area classification of "C-2" commercial prohibited the
sale of beer, it was held that such restriction did not contravene the
Texas Liquor Control Act."
1947) ; Driskell v. Bd. of Adjustment, 195 S. W. (2d) 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) refused,
no reversible error.
56 City of Corpus Christi Ordinance No. 2266, Art. VI, § 1 (1948).
'5 Ibid, Art. XX, § 2.
58 lbid, Art. VI, § 6.
59 Eckert v. Jacobs, 142 S. W. (2d) 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
1949]
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The zoning statute is no basis for an ordinance prohibiting the
erection of a wooden building."0
The state zoning statutes have no application to an ordinance
limiting the use of a public street by establishing parking meters.6
Finally, it should be noted that federal government agencies or
installations are excepted from the provisions of zoning
ordinances."'
Height and Area Requirements
Most zoning ordinances include area and height regulations as
a part of the district use restrictions. Of course these restrictions
must be an integral part of the comprehensive zoning plan and
must be designed to promote the public health, safety or general
welfare.
The term "area requirements," as generally used, means the
distance from front, side and back property lines on which struc-
tures, buildings or certain uses may not be placed or made and/or
the percentage of land which may be occupied by a structure.
Undoubtedly the Euclid case set the pattern for the inclusion of
such area regulations, which are parts of a comprehensive zoning
scheme, within the valid exercise of the police power, and in
Gorieb v. Fox6 the United States Supreme Court ruled directly on
the point, upholding the validity of such regulations.
Where a building permit had been issued for construction of a
residence having a frontal set-back of 35 feet and improvements
had been made, it was held error to cancel such permit. "
Building line restrictions are enforceable against structure addi-
tions extending into the restricted area."
60 West University Place v. Martin, 113 S. W. (2d) 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
61 Harper v. City of Wichita Falls, 105 S. W. (2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) writ
of error refused.
6 2 YOKLEY, ZoNING LAW AND PRACTICE (1948).
63 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
64 Bd. of Adjustment of West University Place v. Jones, 153 S. W. (2d) 510 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941).
65 Stuckert v. Morris, 194 S. W. (2d) 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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Like use restrictions, such area and height regulations must be
reasonable and must apply uniformly to the various classes of
property in the various use districts.
One typical area restriction, in which any motorist can see the
wisdom, is that which prohibits walls, fences, structures, signs,
shrubs, hedges or embankments on corner lots when they interfere
with traffic vision. 6
II
PROCEDURE
Original Enactment, Repeal and Amendment of City Ordinances
Article 1011d is the source of the cities' authority to put their
zoning power into effect:
"The legislative body of such municipality shall provide for the man-
ner in which such regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of
such districts shall be determined, established and enforced and from
time to time amended, supplemented or changed. '67
This article also provides that at least 15 days notice of public
hearing, by publication in an official paper, or a paper of general
circulation,6" shall be given prior to enactment of such ordinances
and that no ordinance shall become effective until interested
parties have had an opportunity to be beard.6 Accordingly, it has
been held that failure of a City Council to give the proper notice
of such public hearing invalidates the ordinance adopted. The
ordinance proper does not have to define classified areas but may
make an attached map, which delineates the zoned areas, a part
of it by reference.7
66 City of Dallas Ordinance No 4047, Art. 165-21 § 21 (1947).
67 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1011d.
r8 It has been held a private publication featuring religious and other news is a paper
of general circulation within the meaning of the statute. City of Corpus Christi v. Jones,
144 S. W. (2d) 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ of error dismissed, judgment correct.
69 TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1011d.
70 Peters v. Gough, 86 S. W. (2d) 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
71 Eckert v. Jacobs, 142 S. W. (2d) 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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Similar notice and public hearing are required prior to the
amendment, modification or repeal of ordinances. 2 While city
councils ordinarily enact zoning ordinances by majority vote, the
statute provides that if 20% of the property owners in an area in
which an ordinance change is proposed, protest the change, the
amendment becomes effective only upon a 3/4 majority vote."3
Article 1011f provides for the appointment of zoning commis-
sions "to recommend the boundaries of the various original dis-
tricts and appropriate regulations to be enforced therein.. ."' It
further provides that these commissions are to hold public hear-
ings before submitting final reports to the city legislative bodies
and that the latter shall not take action until such reports have
been received."5
Thus, the zoning commission is a purely advisory body. Property
owners may petition the commission to hear a request for a change
in an existing zoning ordinance, and in the event of a favorable
vote by the commission it forwards to the city council a recom-
mendation that the change be made. The administrative procedure
by which these petitions may be laid before the zoning commission
is a matter of local "ground rules." Whether the commission has
authority to make recommendations on its own initiative, without
directive from the council or petition from property owners, is
an open question, but apparently it may do so.
In 1945 the Legislature enacted Article 1011k"6 which provides
that cities having a population of 290,000 which have adopted
comprehensive zoning ordinances, may be divided into neighbor-
hood zoning areas, and that a Neighborhood Advisory Zoning
Council may be set up in each area to advise the zoning commis-
sion and make recommendations upon zoning changes requested
in the area. The same rules concerning notice and public hearing
72 Trox. RE v. Civ. STAT. ANrN. (1925) Art. 1011e.
75 Ibid.
74 Id., Art. 1011f.
75 Ibid.
76 Id., Art. 1011k.
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apply to the zoning council, and its recommendations cannot be
overruled by the commission except by 3/4 vote.
The city council may, on its own motion, change or repeal any
zoning regulation, but apparently it is not reqired to act upon any
petition submitted to it. However, by self-imposed regulations
some councils must act upon a proposed change, within 90 days,
when the owners of 50% of the property within 200 feet of the
area in question request such change."
Permits and Certificates of Occupancy
The zoning enforcement officer is a city official usually designated
city building inspector or commissioner. In this capacity he de-
cides upon the conformity with existing ordinances before issuing
building or repair permits or occupancy certificates. He also de-
termines whether a zoning violation exists, and may require proof
of property owners that their non-conforming uses existed prior
to the enactment of the zoning ordinance."'
Permits are generally required for the erection, alteration, mov-
ing or enlargement of any building."9 It is normally required that
applications must be accompanied by plans or architects drawings.
A permit may be revoked after issuance and prior to completion
of construction since no vested right accrues to the permit holder!0
Most zoning ordinances require that certificates of occupancy be
obtained as a prerequisite to the use of vacant land or of buildings
newly erected or altered. It is often provided that no building per-
mit shall be issued unless a certificate of occupancy has also been
applied for. Such certificates are issued, of course, only when the
use will be in conformity with the zoning regulations.
77 City of Fort Worth Ordinance No. 2082 as amended, § 24 (1940).
is Washington v. City of Dallas, 159 S. W. (2d) 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
79 City of Corpus Christi Ordinance No. 2266, Art. XIX (1948).
so City of Dallas v. Meserole, 155 S. W. (2d) 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) writ of




By statute the municipal legislative body of a city may create
a Board of Adjustment and give it the following powers:
1. To make special exceptions to the terms of an ordinance.
2. To authorize such variances from the terms of an ordinance
as will not be contrary to the public interest, in order to prevent
unneccessary hardship.
3. To determine whether an error has been made by an admin-
istrative official in the enforcement of an ordinance."1
Thus, one of the functions of the Board is to hear appeals from
orders of building inspectors or commissioners, such as their
orders denying building permits. Appeals may be taken to the
Board within "a reasonable time '8 2 and the officer whose order is
appealed from must transmit all papers in the matter to the Board.
The Chairman of the Board may administer oaths and compel
attendance of witnesses and any party may appear by attorney.
Due notice to the interested parties and public hearing are pro-
vided for.8"
The Board is empowered to "reverse or affirm... or... modify
the order ... appealed from and... make such order... as ought
to be made...,,
Thus it appears that the Board's functions are administrative,
fact finding and quasi-judicial in nature.8" As a fact finding and
quasi-judicial body it determines whether the city official has
properly interpreted the zoning ordinance, and as an administra-
tive body (if it decides that the official's decision was wrong) it
may issue th'e proper order.
The statute authorizes the Board to make special exceptions to




5 Because of the quasi-judicial aspect, the Board's orders are not subject to collateral
attack. Washington v. City of Dallas, 159 S. W. (2d) 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
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and authorize variances from zoning ordinances to prevent un-
necessary hardship;" Accordingly, many city ordinances authorize
the Board to extend a district where a district boundary cuts
through a single lot, to permit, for limited periods, in a resi-
dential district a commercial building used in furtherance of
residential development, and to permit transitional uses in the
case of property abutting on a commercial district, etc. In City of
Amarillo v. Stapf87 the court said:
"... we state as our conclusion that the Board of Adjustment... is
created primarily for the purpose of varying or modifying zoning reg-
ulations in particular cases as the exigencies of justice and the circum-
stances may require."88
Yet, theoretically, at least, the Board cannot make or amend
zoning ordinances, since that is a legislative function and since
the Board is not and cannot legally be vested with legislative
power. 9
Whether the granting of an exception or variance is an act
properly within the Board's power or whether it is an invalid
usurpation of legislative power is a question about which there is
some confusion.
In Harrington v. Board of Adjustment the Board allowed an
exception by permitting the commercial use of a single corner lot
in a residential district. The court found such action to be legisla-
itve in nature, hence void. Again, in Texas Consolidated Theaters
v. Pittillo" the Board granted an exception in a residential dis-
trict by permitting the establishment of an auto parking lot in
the rear of a theater. In holding the Board's order invalid the
86 TE. RFv. Crv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1011g.
87 129 Tex. 81, 101 S. W. (2d) 229 (Tex. Comm. App. 1937).
88 Id at 85, 101 S. W. (2d) 229, 233.
89 "The Board is not permitted to enact legislation. That is the function of the City
Council and it cannot be usurped by nor delegated to the Board of Adjustment." Har-
rington v. Board of Adjustment, 124 Si W. (2d) 401, 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
90 124 S. W. (2d) 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) writ of error refused.
"1204 S. W. (2d) 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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court stated that if the Board could authorize a variance to the
extent of the use of half a city block for a purpose prohibited by
ordinance, then there was "no valid reason why it should not also
be empowered upon successive applications to permit the use of
one or more blocks in any zoned district for any lawful purposes
provided only that it be satisfied from the evidence presented in
each successive hearing that the refusal of such application would
result in 'unnecessary hardship'...""
On the other hand, in the recent case of Driskell v. Board of
Adjustment"' another court of civil appeals upheld a Board in
allowing an exception covering eight blocks in a residential dis-
trict, for the purpose of establishing a private orphanage. The
court held that the Board acted properly in order to prevent unnec-
esary hardship and that such action was not legislative in nature.
In City of San Angelo v. Boehme Bakery"4 the Supreme Court
stated that the Board of Adjustment was not lacking in authority
to grant a permit for the purpose of adding a garage, boiler room
and tool-shed onto a non-conforming commercial building. On
this point the court specifically approved the opinion of the Court
of Civil Appeals' which held that the permit desired involved an
"exception" which was within the Board's power, rather than a
reclassification of property, which, of course, is not. But the Su-
preme Court has as yet laid down no authoritative yardstick by
which to tell when a change in use ceases to be an "exception" and
becomes legislative reclassification.
The property owner seeking to obtain an exception to a zoning
ordinance faces the following quandry: If, upon denial of a per-
mit by a building inspector, he appeals to the Board of Adjust-
ment and is there granted an exception, and if the city then appeals
to the courts, it may be held, as in the Harrington and Pitillo
92 Id w 399.
" 195 S. W. (2d) 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) writ of error refused, no reversible error.
91 144 Tex. 281, 190 S. W. (2d) 67 (1945).
95 185 S. W. (2d) 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
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cases, that the Board's action was an invalid attempt to legislate.
On the other hand, if he goes before the zoning commission, thence
to the city council, which is the proper body to grant the change
by legislation, and if the council turns him down and he appeals
direct to the courts, his appeal may be rejected in that he has failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing to the Board
of Adjustment.
The safest procedure, if the desired change involves as much as
a city lot, would seem to be to pursue both courses: first attempt to
get an ordinance amendment through the legislative body (City
Council via zoning commission) and, failing there, apply for a
building permit from the building inspector or commissioner, and
upon its rejection, appeal to the Board of Adjustment for an
exception.
Appeal to the Courts
The only method of appeal from the ruling of a Board of
Adjustment is by certiorari. It is provided by statute that "any
person ... taxpayer... officer, department, board or bureau of the
municipality""6 may present to the district court ' within ten days
a petition setting forth that a decision of the Board is illegal and
why. Upon presentation of the petition the court may issue a writ
of certiorari to review the decision of the Board. The court sets
out the time, not less than ten days, within which the return must
be made by the Board. This return must set forth such facts as
are material to show the grounds of the Board's decision. The
court may take evidence or it may appoint a referee to take evi-
dence and report the same with findings of fact and conclusions
of law. 8
It has been held that the only question which may be raised by
96 TEx. REV. Cfv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1011g.
97 "Since jurisdiction is not conferred upon any particular court, it follows that under
the provisions of Art. 1909 R. S. 1925, the district court is the proper tribunal in which
to institute the proceeding." City of San Angelo v. Boehme Bakery, 144 Tex. 281, 283,
190 S. W. (2d) 67, 70 (1945).
98 T. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1011g.
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a petition to the court is the "legality of the board's order.""9
Whether the board's order is "legal" is, in most instances, a ques-
tion of whether or not the Board has abused its discretion in arriv-
ing at its decision. The court cannot substitute its discretion for
that of the Board, but whether there has been an abuse of' dis-
cretion is a question of law, and a "very clear showing" of such
abuse must be found in order to overturn the board's ruling.
A heavy burden thus rests upon a petitioner seeking to show
abuse of discretion by the board. In the Boehme Bakery case the
trial court found that the evidence was overwhelmingly in favor
of granting the requested permit, yet it also found that the evi-
dence did not show that the board acted arbitrarily, fraudulently
or capriciously in denying the permit. The Supreme Court held
that these findings were in no sense conflicting.100
There is another method of reaching the courts in a zoning case,
in addition to certiorari to the Board of Adjustment, and that is
by direct attack, in a proper case, upon the constitutionality of the
ordinance itself. In City of Amarillo v. Stapf01° it was stated:
"The question of whether or not an ordinance prohibiting the con-
struction of a particular kind of building or preventing a particular
kind of use, at a particular location, is unreasonable, arbitrary or dis-
criminatory, is a question peculiarly within the province of the courts.
An owner of property is entitled to direct access to the courts for the
purpose of litigating such questions, regardless of whether the zoning
ordinance has made provision therefor or not."102
A presumption exists that the ordinance passed by the city legis-
lative body is valid. Even though "it should appear that a classifi-
cation made is of doubtful validity, yet a court cannot substitute
its judgment for that of the legislative body ...
90 City of San Angelo v. Boehme Bakery, 144 Tex. 281, 190 S. W. (2d) 67 (1945).
100 Ibid.
201 129 Tex. 81, 101 S. W. (2d) 229 (Tex. Comm. App. 1937).
102 Id at 85, 101 S. W. (2d) 229, 233.
203 Barrington v. City of Sherman, 155 S. W. (2d) 1008, writ of error refused, want
of merit (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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Among the decisions in this state there appears an uncertainty
as to the province of the jury in zoning cases. In the case of Bar-
rington v. City of Sherman'" the trial court gave a peremptory
instruction to the jury to find for the defendant city, which had
not offered any evidence. The Civil Appeals Court reversed and
remanded, holding that an issue as to the existence of a de facto
business area and the reasonableness of the ordinance should have
been submitted to the jury. Chief Justice Bond, in this case, vary-
ing from the reasoning of the majority opinion, contended that the
reasonableness of an ordinance is a question for the court to
"determine as a matter of law and not for jury verdicts."
In the case of City of Dallas vs. Lively,'"" where a jury found
that the classification was unreasonable and arbitrary, the court,
in reversing and rendering, held that, since the presumption of
validity is in favor of the city and the courts must so find if there
are issuable facts, and the submission of a matter to a jury is of
itself the concession of an issuable fact and in turn effects the
presumption.
In an earlier Texas Supreme Court case,' the court in speaking
of ordinances and the question generally, held that in such cases
the court can only determine as to the validity or the invalidity of
the ordinance when the facts upon which the question depends are
established, and if they are in dispute, they are to be determined
as other matters of fact.
Right to Appeal
In a very recent case0 7 it was held that a Board of Adjustment
has an appealable interest from an adverse ruling of the trial
court. The Supreme Court stated:
104 Ibid.
105 161 S. W. (2d) 895 (Tex. Civ. App.) 1942) writ of error refused.
106 H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. City of Dallas, 98 Tex. 396, 84 S. W. 648 (1905).
107 Board of Adjustment v. StovaU, - Tex. __, 216 S. W. (2d) 171 (Tex. Civ. App.
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"Under other statutes, where essentially the same kind of review is
authorized, the right of a board or commission to appeal from judg-
ments nullifying its orders has apparently never been questioned...
the review authorized by Art. 1011g... is not essentially different in
nature from the review contemplated by the other statutes we have
referred to. ... In proceedings of this kind, the board represents the
public interest in the proper enforcement of the particular law or regu-
lation involved. In zoning cases, the public is properly interested in the
granting or withholding of permits for non-conforming uses."1s
The same case held that as a governmental agency, a board of
adjustment does not have to file an appeal bond.
Enforcement
Zoning ordinances generally provide for their enforcement by
the city manager or other officer and assess penalties for viola-
tions." 9 Such a penal provision was upheld by the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals in Ex parte Hobbs."' In that case the appellant had
been convicted and fined for violation of the Fort Worth Zoning
Ordinance. Upon default of payment of the fine he was arrested
and taken into custody. In seeking his release through writ of
habeas corpus he attacked the validity of the penal provision of
the ordinance on the grounds that the zoning statute under which
the ordinance was passed did not authorize the passage of a penal
provision, and further that any such penal ordinance was void as
class legislation in that each city in the state could fix a different
punishment for the same act. The court, overruling both conten-
tions, stated that the penal provision of the ordinance in question
was necessary and incident to the full accomplishment of the pur-
pose of the statute, and that since the ordinance applied only to
the city and since no other person or class outside of that city was
affected, the ordinance was not class legislation, hence not subject
to the claimed constitutional invalidity.
30s Ibid.
209 See City of Fort Worth Ordinance No. 2082 as amended, § 26 (1940) which pro-
vides fines of $5 to $50 for violations each day that such violations continue constituting
a separate offense.
110 143 Tex. Crim. Rep. 100, 157 S. W. (2d) 397 (1941).
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CONCLUSIONS
The original zoning of a municipality, as well as subsequent
revisions and expansions of the zoning plan, should be undertaken
only after thorough investigation and expert analysis of the pres-
ent and probable future needs of the city community. All too
often ordinances have been adopted without sufficient study, or
forethought, and this has inevitably resulted in uneconomic utiliza-
tion of valuable property, inconvenience to the inhabitants gen-
erally and cases of real hardship to individuals, much of which
could have been avoided by the adoption of a logical, comprehen-
sive well thought-out plan.
Once a comprehensive plan is established, reclassification of
certain small areas will usually be necessary to meet the peculiar
needs of the particular city, but this "spot zoning," so called,
should be done with extreme caution and only after full consid-
eration of the economic and social consequences to the surround-
ing areas which will probably result.
As the urban communities of this state continue to grow and the
problem of zoning becomes more and more vital, consideration
should be given to the desirability of placing the Zoning Com-
missions and Boards of Adjustment on a civil service basis. Giving
all due credit to the public spirited citizens who generously con-
tribute their time and efforts to these bodies, there can be no doubt
that full time, technically expert, professional engineers and plan-
ners would function with greater efficiency and that better zoning
would result.
Of more immediate and practical concern to lawyers is the
problem of working with the zoning set-ups in existence at the pres-
ent. In this regard, the first and perhaps most important lesson to
be learned is that once a zoning matter has been determined by
the city, it is seldom set aside. That lesson, of course, counsels the
attorney to go "all out" to win his case in the city.
As noted herein, there are a number of points of both the sub-
stantive and procedural law of zoning that are in need of clari-
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fication; a number of others have not yet been judicially inter-
preted in this jurisdiction.
It goes without saying that attorneys who represent owners or
purchasers of city property or land which may some day be
annexed to the city, should familiarize themselves with the prevail-
ing zoning ordinances and keep abreast of the changes and amend-
ments thereto.
There can be no doubt that zoning will be a permanent factor
in future city development and a matter of very real concern to
every urban property owner, yet most city inhabitants are partially
if not totally ignorant of the terms and interpretation of their ordi-
nances and the reasons behind their zoning laws. Therefore it is
suggested that cities operating under comprehensive zoning
schemes would do well to incorporate as an integral part of their
zoning programs a public "zoning education" program. An en-
lightened and understanding citizenry would not only minimize
day-to-day zoning difficulty, but the public interest created should
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